21 October 2002

William Robinson
7600 Sand Point Way N.E.
Seattle, WA 98115-0070.

RE: PCFFA/IFR comments on “West Coast Salmon Harvest Draft
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement” (DEIS)

Dear Mr. Robinson:

Attached below are the comments of the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations (PCFFA) and the Institute for Fisheries Resources (IFR) on the “West Coast Salmon Harvest Draft Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement” (DEIS), for your consideration. The following comments are focused on the Pacific Coast management scheme, but may also have equal relevance to the Alaska and Columbia River regions, where many of the same problems occur.

CUMULATIVE EFFECTS

On Page ES-13, Factor 3 in cumulative effects refers to “potential for intervening mortality that may occur between the affected fishery and the spawning grounds.” If this is a reference to impacts on stocks from causes other than fishing, it is not clearly stated.

Cumulative impacts of fisheries must be considered within the context of all impacts other than harvest, such as habitat loss, hatcheries, hydropower, and flow regimes, or an unfair and unrealistic burden is placed on fishermen for the success of stocks. If activities allowed by another state or federal agency, such as the California Board of Forestry or the Department of Fish and Game, or the Bureau of Reclamation, causes a mortality of listed or unlisted species that affects management of that stock for future years, there must be consideration of the equity of the liability for that loss and recovery plans must also take this into account as well.

Section 7(a)(1) and 7(a)(2) of the ESA require federal agencies to conserve listed species, and not allow activities to endanger them. Case law is also clear that state agencies can, under some circumstances, also become liable for a “take” of listed species (Strahan v. Coxe, 939 F. Supp. 963, aff’d in part, vacated in part, Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1^st Cir. October 9, 1997), cert. denied, Strahan v. Coxe, 525 U.S. 978 (Nov. 2, 1998)). This statute must be applied equitably to non-harvest activities governed by other federal and state agencies as well as to the PFMC. When harvest reductions have allowed adequate spawners to return, (“...curtailing fishing has enabled spawning goals of some stocks to be achieved”) but other habitat factors have primarily caused declines in production, fishermen should not be penalized for the failure of other agencies to enforce habitat standards.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACTS

In Appendix D, the section on Alternative 3 assumes that there will be in increase in economic value of the resource over time as recovery occurs. While this may be true in theory, as a practical matter this can occur only if other factors leading to the decline of these species are also controlled.

Twenty years ago the Pacific Fisheries Management Council promised the fishing industry that harvest reduction measures would lead to a stronger resource and economy in the future, but this has not been the case. Other habitat-based factors have never been adequately addressed. Recovery Plans for listed salmonids are not being prepared in a timely manner, allowing continued degradation of habitat and perpetuating an unfair burden on fishermen. Both in California and Oregon, those state governments have been allowed to delay consequences of ESA listings by promising to reform forestry rules to NMFS standards for recovery. Neither state has kept its agreements, allowing some large timber companies additional years to complete their liquidation of large trees and the destruction of key riparian areas on which coho salmon are dependant. Fishermen and fishing-dependent communities have paid heavily for these irreparable degradations.

Section 12.2: Magnuson-Stevens Act conservation and socio-economic objectives require maximizing socio-economic benefits of the fisheries consistent with long-term sustainability of fishery resources.

Chapter 1, on page 8, “All alternatives addressed in this DEIS will not jeopardize listed ESUs.” Alternative 1 would be the least damaging to the resource with no increase in impact to communities.

Section ES.3.2 refers cavalierly to expected substantial human environment impacts in the overall Pacific Coast region as insignificant, based on the percentage of income in each county from salmon fishing. The actual human impacts of complete closure of the salmon fishery (Alternative 3), or of closing the ocean fishery while increasing the inland sport fishery (Alternative 2) would be much greater than estimated, when the following factors are taken into account.

The human impacts from Alternative 2, which would reallocate resources from the commercial sector to the sport fishing sector would aggravate antagonism between these economic sectors, with long-term economic deficits to the commercial fishing sector. We would like to see long-term benefits from recovering the resource and eventual de-listings if possible. Also, regardless of “regional impacts” and substitutions of business, re-allocations hurt people and their economic and social impact is substantial.

1) The Losses Are Localized In Fishing Communities, Concentrating Their Effect. The closures of salmon fisheries in the 1980’s and 90’s off California were devastating to the economy and social structure of isolated and heavily fishing-dependent coastal towns. In the 20 years since 1982, according to section 3.4.3.2 of the Draft EIS, 9,800 commercial salmon trollers have gone out of business or no longer make landings, which is 88% of the West Coast commercial salmon fleet.

2) Socioeconomic Impacts To The Regions Should Be Based On The Thriving Fishery Of 20 Years Ago. This would have been before season closures destroyed the economies of the coastal fishing communities. The baseline for comparison should not be the fisheries of today when the fishing economies, infrastructure, and society that these fisheries supported are nearly gone. Any further impacts would add exponentially to the losses already sustained by coastal communities, by finishing off those few fishing-dependent businesses which have managed to hang on.

The estimate of socioeconomic impacts to the region must also include the primary, secondary and induced effects from:

3) Closing Of Associated Businesses. Fishing-dependent businesses such as marine engineers, gear stores, fish processors and brokers, fuel depots, haul-out and repair facilities have largely been lost. Also, businesses benefiting from the local income stream which would otherwise have been spent at local markets, restaurants, bars, clothing stores, pharmacies, etc. have also suffered.

4) Loss of infrastructure. Fishermen can no longer haul out for repairs in many ports, find parts, buy gear locally, or choose between competing fish companies, due to so many fishing support and infrastructure businesses closing. Harbors cannot maintain marinas, which were financed based on projected use that can no longer materialize. The Army Corps of Engineers and harbors can no longer justify the expense of dredging channels, leading to unsafe conditions for remaining fishermen, such as in Noyo Harbor.

5) Loss of markets. In Section 3.4, loss of markets is attributed to the influx of farmed salmon. Also, Appendix D, page 3 assumes that a reduction in quantity causes an increase in price to the fisherman. Appendix D also assumes an increase in market prices from a lower harvest, reducing customer surplus, and making things worse for the consumer. Appendix D, page 6 assumes that competitive markets exist with unconstrained entry and exit. Many of these assumptions are false or cannot be made without qualifications.

Actually, a greatly reduced supply of commercial harvest product caused a long-term loss of major markets, allowing farmed salmon operations to capture many of our traditional markets, and thus subsequent increased supply resulted in a very low price. Commercial salmon trollers were simply unable to keep up a supply of product due to increasingly restrictive season closures and this more than any other factor has caused our world markets for salmon to be filled by farm-raised salmon, leaving only a limited local fresh-fish market for the ocean-caught fish. Testimony to the PFMC in the 1980s that brokers could only tolerate 7-day gaps in supply were followed by a series of 10-day closures during the season, and Pacific Coast trollers thus lost major world markets. The result is that when large volumes of salmon are landed, as in the incredibly good ocean year of 2002, the price went lower in California than in the previous 30 years ($.85/lb). Processors closed their doors after the first three weeks of the season in Bodega Bay, and some fishermen were unable to unload their catch in Fort Bragg in July. George Boling, F/V Sunup from Eureka, was one fisherman who found no one willing to take his load of fish when he came in from a salmon trip. The law required the fish to be unloaded in Fort Bragg, yet the marketing infrastructure in that port had all but collapsed due to prior run declines. Coho brought $1.00/lb. from the processor, or $3.00/lb. when sold to the public before 1985, a good price even before adjusting for inflation to today’s prices.

Since the mid-1980s, we have had severe area closures for coho salmon off California, long before ESA listings. These closures were required under weak stock management principles simply by the increasing decline of access to and availability of good quality spawning and rearing habitat throughout the west coast.

6) Changing The Character And Thus The Attractiveness Of Communities. Tourist income is based partly on the charm of a working fishing village. Ports that look like ghost towns, with substantial boats falling derelict at the docks, are far less attractive. A working port attracts not only fishing-dependent jobs but tourism dollars (as for instance Fishermen’s Warf in San Francisco, which supports a huge tourism trade). The link between vital working ports and tourism should also be made.

7) Damage To Small Family Businesses. Many small fishing businesses have suffered from lost (suddenly devalued) equipment investment. Essentially no compensation has been given to fishermen who owned boats, the value of which dropped suddenly to less than zero but with increased liability and upkeep. Many beautiful fishing boats went derelict because there was no longer a market value for them. Many resold at less than 10 cents on the dollar of original investment, and others were simply abandoned.

8) Damage To Families And Communities. Lost income and displacement of business in isolated rural coastal communities leaves in its wake a tremendous load of social problems, all deriving from economic distress. Loss of their investment leaves families without options for reinvesting in other forms of education or employment. Other impacts include fishermen having to travel far from their families to fish at all, with the resultant estrangement of children, hardship on partners at home, and extra danger of travel at sea. The hardship of moving to take other employment, loss of homes due to lost ability to pay mortgages--these impacts continue for generations. A number of fishermens’ lives have been lost in accidents relating to the adjustment to other employment or travel to distant fisheries, leaving children to grow up without fathers. These pervasive social costs can have large economic costs as well, and need to be accounted for.

9) Lost Participation By Fishing Communities In Management Decisions Due To Poverty And Dislocation, And Loss Of Faith In Management Regimes. Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C. 1851, Sec. 301[a], National Standards #8 includes a standard for maximization of public participation. Fishing farther from home decreases the accessibility to notices and process participation. We believe, for instance, that the scoping meetings for this DEIS were poorly noticed. Many fishermen are now much harder to reach, more widely scattered, and less able to participate in general. 19 testimonies and 17 written comments is not very many people participating in a process that could impact coastal communities extensively. Furthermore, many people are giving up on the process itself, and have lost faith that it is a fair and meaningful process or that their input is even considered. This loss of faith in the process has ominous implications for the future and can only lead to more alienation and conflict.

MODELING

Use Up-To-Date Figures For Your Assessment Of These Important Stocks. Escapement success is based on Council figures from 1999. The years of 2000-2002 have been extremely rich ocean years, with higher than recent returns to many Pacific Coast rivers, and should be considered in any assessment of salmon stock status. Since 1999, the Sacramento River Winter Run chinook, for example, have been exceeding the standards set by agencies. Many other rivers had unexpectedly high returns of coho and chinook for the years 2000-2002.

Nowhere in the designing of fisheries management regimes are the number of parent fish considered. Instead, seasons are based on escapement estimates based on the previous year’s return of adults. Your assessment of fish stocks is based on the resulting escapement numbers, not the actual number of spawning parents. For instance, for the Sacramento Winter Run the NMFS 97 Biological Opinion requires fisheries to be managed for a 31% increase in 3-year adult replacement rates relative to the 89-93 brood years. (Council 2001a) Wherever possible, your models should use spawner pairs, and thus be sensitive to spawner success rates, and not just the gross ocean escapement numbers.

As an example, in this year’s massive fish kill in the Klamath Basin, use only of the calculated ocean escapement without acknowledging the unprecedented die-off of at least 30,000 fall chinook within the river (due to very low flows and extremely adverse water conditions) would lead to grossly over-optimistic projections of 2005 season returns, which would inevitably lead to overfishing. Thank you for the opportunity to comment.

Sincerely,

Glen H. Spain
For PCFFA/IFR