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The November 7th Cosco Busan disaster in the San Francisco Bay was a relatively small oil spill that turned into a major fiasco.
The ineptitude and incompetence of the federal and state lead agencies -- the U.S. Coast Guard and the California Department of Fish & Game -- in failing to respond in a timely manner or to utilize local resources available to them, including the fishing fleet, led to a spill covering San Francisco Bay and extending north, south and west beyond the Golden Gate. The Dungeness crab and herring fisheries were subsequently closed with a great deal of uncertainty now about long-term damages to those fisheries and others, such as salmon.
There are lessons to be learned by the fleet from what happened, and much that fishermen should be doing now to protect themselves and their fisheries against a similar botched response in the future.
PCFFA was asked to present testimony in three different hearings following the spill, to the U. S. House Coast Guard & Marine Infrastructure Subcommittee, the California Assembly Natural Resources & Water as well as the Government Organization Committees, and the U. S. Senate Natural Resources & Water Committee. The following is a condensed version of that testimony that we hope will be useful to fishermen along the coast concerned with preventing, containing and cleaning-up any future oil spills. Full copies of this testimony is posted on the PCFFA website.
Good morning. I wish to thank the Committees for the opportunity to provide brief comments today on what the fishing fleet has observed regarding the 7 November fuel oil spill by the container ship Cosco Busan in San Francisco Bay – both as to the response and the known impacts.
Before discussing the observations and concerns that have been raised by fishermen regarding this latest oil spill, for context its critical to recognize the biological and economic significance of San Francisco Bay and the waters out into the Gulf of the Farallones. The importance of these waters goes far beyond their use for merchant shipping.
San Francisco Bay is the single most important estuary along the West Coast of North and South America. This estuary is fed by the freshwater inflow from the snow pack and watershed of the Sierra mixing with the ocean waters of the Pacific in the Bay and Delta creating a biologically rich null zone. It flows into the Gulf of the Farallones where the waters, north to Point Arena, are nourished by the strongest ocean upwelling system in North America.
San Francisco Bay provides one of the largest nursery grounds for Dungeness crab along the Pacific Coast. It is the juvenile crab utilizing this Bay as a nursery that are harvested as adults in the Gulf of the Farallones. Dungeness crab is the symbol of San Francisco’s Fisherman’s Wharf; its season opening is celebrated and for many it is as much a part of Thanksgiving as turkey in the Bay region.
San Francisco Bay supports a large run of Pacific herring, which begin spawning in the Bay about this time, continuing until March. This run, in turn, supports the largest herring fishery south of British Columbia. In fact, the San Francisco Bay herring fishery is the nation’s last urban commercial fishery (following the closure of much of the shad fishery of the Hudson River because of PCB pollution) where fishing can be observed a few yards away from a sidewalk in Sausalito or a high rise in San Francisco or Oakland.
San Francisco Bay and the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is the passage way from the Pacific to the Sierra streams for the second largest chinook salmon run in the lower 48 states. The Central Valley fall-run chinook, in recent years, have accounted for more than 90 percent of California’s salmon catch and upwards of 60 percent of the chinook salmon harvested offshore Oregon. The Delta and Bay are where young salmon grow and build strength before heading to sea. The health of the San Francisco Delta and Bay have a direct bearing on salmon abundance.
It is because of its regional importance for fish and wildlife that special care is needed for San Francisco Bay’s protection. This is why prevention of oil spills coupled with prompt response and quick and effective clean-up, when spills do occur, is critical.
You have seen from the newspaper reports the huge public outpouring of offers to help respond to this spill. The local community has a strong sense of stewardship for the Bay and Gulf of the Farallones. Fishermen, too, share that sense of stewardship, depending as they do on the productivity of this Bay and the waters off the Golden Gate for their livelihood. That is why our coastwide organization has focused so much of its attention for the past 30 years on the protection of San Francisco Bay -- whether it has been fighting for better water quality, fighting for the freshwater inflows critical for maintaining estuarine function and opposing further upstream diversion of this essential inflow, or working to prevent the introduction, as well as the control and eradication, of invasive aquatic species.
Following the Exxon Valdez spill and the subsequent passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (“OPA 90”) and passage by the California Legislature of the Lempert-Keene-Seastrand Oil Spill Prevention & Response Act, private oil spill clean-up cooperatives, established by the merchant shipping companies and oil industry, began contracting members of the fishing fleet to train and certify the captains and their vessels as a kind of auxiliary to the companies’ own personnel and equipment for oil spill containment and clean-up. Fishermen had, without training, already demonstrated their competence in this work in Prince William Sound. The reasoning was, why not provide them formal training, certify them, and place oil spill containment and clean-up equipment in strategic locations for their use in the event of a spill.
This made a lot of sense, at least at the time, to the private clean-up companies. It seemed to enjoy the support as well of the responsible federal (i.e., Coast Guard) and, here in California, state (i.e., Department of Fish & Game’s Oil Spill Prevention & Response unit) agencies. Utilizing commercial fishermen and their vessels would cut down on the number of response vessels and personnel the private companies would require on a permanent basis – resources that remain idle until there is a spill. Fishermen possess expertise of local waters; their vessels are workboats -- mostly with large decks that can handle and deploy oil spill equipment.
During the 1990’s many fishermen along the Pacific Coast were contracted by the private oil response firms. They were trained, including in the deployment of booms and clean-up equipment, they were certified, they participated in drills and, we assumed were listed in contingency plans for containment and clean-up. Contacts between the companies and the fleet were established for responding quickly to a spill.
My estimate, based on the information I was receiving from my members at the time, is that between one-third and, perhaps, as high as half of the fleet went through training and certification. From all of the information I had received, the companies and the responsible agencies were satisfied with the capabilities of the fishing fleet and considered them a part of any clean-up operation.
I was surprised then that by 1999 and 2000, fishermen were reporting to me that the training, and consequently the certification and participation in drills, had stopped. I asked whether it was because the companies or agencies were not satisfied. All the fishermen knew is they were told there was no more money. Thus, for this decade there has been no training I am aware of, much less certification or participation in oil spill drills by members of our fleet.
I raised this issue verbally at various times with Coast Guard, California Fish & Game and National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) personnel, and was told either this was an issue between the fishermen and the private companies, or the question was ignored altogether. I raised this question numerous times with NOAA personnel during a major oil spill drill/press event, “Safe Seas” that was held August 2006 off San Francisco, and still did not receive any answer.
In retrospect, we should have made a formal written request of the responsible agencies asking why this training of fishermen had ceased and whether fishermen and their vessels were being included in any of the oil spill containment and clean-up contingency plans. That was our failure. But certainly proper oversight of the private clean-up companies by the responsible federal and state agencies should have detected this flaw.
Following the accident and resultant spill from the Cosco Busan’s encounter with the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge on Wednesday, the 7th of November 2007, the President of the Crab Boat Owners Association (representing San Francisco Bay commercial fishermen), who himself had gone through oil spill training in the 1990’s, contacted the Coast Guard Thursday morning. He had not heard anything from the Coast Guard, Fish & Game’s OSPR or the private clean-up company, following the accident. He told the Coast Guard he had 30 boats in his association that were trained and certified (during the 1990’s) and prepared to assist in the clean up. He was then told by the Coast Guard that they had it under control, his boats were not needed and “if any fisherman wanted to help they could volunteer to clean birds.”
I subsequently called the Coast Guard Thursday telling them who I was and that fishing boats were available to help with the clean-up. I did not get quite as flip an answer; they took my name and I was contacted the following Sunday by someone in the agency wondering what size boat I had.
On Saturday, the 10th, not having gotten any response from the Coast Guard, Fish & Game or the private company, the Port of San Francisco took it upon itself and hired 20 fishing boats from Fisherman’s Wharf to engage in the clean-up. Since none of the boats had recent training or up-to-date certificates so they were required to each carry two clean-up personnel hired by the private company.
During the few days those boats were on the Bay, they contributed significantly to the clean-up effort, often able to get in close to shore where the larger vessels of the private operator could not. It also helped that these fishermen had local knowledge, particularly of San Francisco Bay’s treacherous tides and currents.
The Port of San Francisco’s funds ran out Wednesday (14 November) for the fishermen’s clean-up effort. At no time prior to that was the fleet contacted by either the Coast Guard or OSPR to engage in clean-up, although our Fish & Game Department told us the “fishermen’s OSPR contracts would be ending Wednesday because most of the oil had been cleaned-up in the Bay.” We found that strange, since OPPR did not actually have any fishing boats under contract. But then there were far more significant foibles and break-downs in communication during this oil spill than that Fish & Game misstatement. Two fishing boats, I should note, were hired after Wednesday the 14th by the private company to continue in the clean-up.
In response to what was happening, it became apparent by Friday, the 9th, that there was a good chance the oil would be getting out the Gate. Keep in mind no fishing closure had been ordered, even though the oil had spread through much of the Bay. We had already learned that some oil picked up from the Bay had contaminated at least one fish processor’s live tank at the Wharf. A meeting was called on Saturday, the 10th among crab fishermen planning on fishing the 15 November opener to decide what to do.
That Saturday, by a unanimous vote, crab fishermen called for the Governor to use his emergency authority to close the crab season, despite the immediate economic impact on these fishermen losing their Thanksgiving market, until the oil was cleaned-up and the crab could be tested to assure none was contaminated by the oil. The reason for wanting a closure was simple: fishermen and processors felt they could not risk the chance of any oil-contaminated crab reaching the market, whether it made anyone ill, or simply didn’t taste good. One bad crab could ruin the market for years.
It may have been safe for an individual crabber to go out of either Bodega Bay or Half Moon Bay, fish crab and return to those ports with no problem. But we were faced with an opener where upwards of 300 vessels would be heading out competing for space to drop their traps. California is the only state on the Pacific Coast that does not have trap limits for Dungeness crab, making the situation even more chaotic with massive amounts of gear being dumped (twice crab trap legislation has been vetoed by the Governor).
Fishermen realized it was just too easy for one or more boats, inadvertently or recklessly, to crab from an area that might be oiled or, more likely, transiting through an oiled area where the spilled bunker fuel could be picked up in the saltwater recirculating “live tanks” on deck or in the holds of these vessels. Moreover, as this Legislature knows well, Fish & Game’s warden forced is badly understaffed – there simply was not the enforcement capability to monitor the oil and keep vessels out of oiled areas.
With the volume of crab being handled during the opener it would be impossible to inspect each crab when they reached the dock and, thus, there was a real potential for crab that may have been contaminated reaching market.
California does test before the beginning of each Dungeness crab season for the naturally occurring toxin, domoic acid. However those tests had already been conducted prior to the oil spill. Crab fishermen were then faced with a typical chaotic opener, uncertainty where the oil might end up, and with no tests to determine whether any crab had become contaminated, and so chose wisely – the vast majority anyway – calling for a delay in the season opening, set for the 15th, until it was known the full extent of where the bunker fuel had spread and tests could be conducted.
The Governor subsequently issued an order Tuesday (12 November) calling for a closure. Unfortunately, the decision of the boundaries of that closure were left to Fish & Game to determine, and those boundaries were not announced until two days later – a full week after the spill and on the day crabbers would ordinarily be heading to sea to set their traps.
The closed area announced Wednesday, the 14th, by the Department included only San Francisco Bay and an ocean area extending from Point Reyes to Pedro Point and out to 3 miles. This left most of the crab grounds open. Oil had already blown north of Point Reyes the prior Saturday and was reported moving west beyond 3 miles.
We should note that California is not restricted to state waters in enforcing most of its fishing regulations, and Congress specifically delegated to the states of Washington, Oregon and California management authority over Dungeness crab in federal waters (3-200 miles) westward of those states. Thus, there were no legal constraints – certainly for crab – from utilizing emergency authority to close a much broader area, erring on the side of caution. Rather than taking a precautionary approach, however, it appeared to us that caution was being thrown to the wind.
Thus, not only was there a delay in implementing a closure, the extent of the closure was not sufficient, at least for crab. We were told Fish & Game had consulted broadly with fishing representatives in establishing the boundaries. Frankly, we don’t know who this group was or who in our industry or within the recreational fishery would be so reckless as to draw the closures so narrow to allow for potentially contaminated fish from being taken. The impression among many of my members is the lines were drawn to reduce damages for fishing losses the spiller may be liable for, and not for public safety or even the reputation of our local fisheries.
What has happened after the 15th was that most crab boats have remained at the dock and most processors have refuse to buy and distribute local crab until testing was done. Thus, while most of the crab season was legally open – under Fish & Game’s closure boundaries – a de facto closure was in place pending testing.
The Department did later, working with our members in Half Moon Bay, San Francisco and Bodega Bay, send out boats to test the crab and other fish for contamination. Those tests came back on the 29th, and the results were announced soon thereafter. Fortunately, excepting for some mussels, it appears fish and shellfish are free of oil contamination. Herring fishermen, whose season was set to open on 2 December, remain concerned however, and are calling for testing of the bottom for oil in the fishing grounds within San Francisco Bay. The worry is that oil on the bottom could be picked up by their nets and contaminate herring in that manner. But testing of the bottom for oil was not set to begin until two days after this season was set to open.
More ominous, perhaps, than immediate human health concerns raised about eating local fish following the spill, is what long-term affects this oil may have on the survival of juvenile crab in the Bay, and on herring spawning and migrating salmon. Financial support will be needed for the long-term monitoring of fish and wildlife impacts from this spill. As we learned from Prince William Sound, oil spill impacts can last for decades.
One of the tragedies surrounding this relatively minor spill (compared to Prince William Sound or the Black Sea) becoming a major mishap, is that only a fraction of the boats waiting in the three ports to go crabbing were used in this containment and clean-up effort. Much more of the oil would have been removed from the water had the training and certification of fishermen continued along with their contracts to engage in oil spill clean-up during this last decade. The private company is at fault here, but so too are the responsible federal and state agencies for failed oversight.
From what has been seen, not only was there a failure to continue the training of the fishing fleet as responders to an oil spill or to engage them when the spill happened, but there seems to have been a real break-down in command as far as utilizing local expertise in this incident.
In previous spills, the personnel from the LOCAL trustees, such as the Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Sanctuary, were always on the inside of the Unified Command with the Coast Guard, Fish & Game and the spiller, advising and answering questions as an integral partner of the Unified Command. This has been very important to the success of all spill response, for the five significant oil spills in the San Francisco Bay Area since OPA 90.
This spill, however, saw the personnel of local trustees placed outside the Unified Command; instead, connected to the Unified Command via an agency liaison, assigned by the agencies’ headquarters. This arrangement is presently the agency-approved format for interaction with the Unified Command. It is clear that the previous configuration used in the San Francisco Bay Area made the Unified Command more efficient, less bureaucratic, and better served the environment as well as leading to smoother operation than the agency-approved arrangement that has been used for this spill.
To believe that citizens, including fishermen, should not want to be involved with protecting our natural resources, fish and wildlife during a disaster like an oil spill is not realistic. When thousands of volunteers want to help, the Unified Command can either put them to work – including fishermen in on the water clean-up – in meaningful, safe and productive tasks, or simply cordon off all the beaches and wharves with police. We suggest the former be the preferred course – to fully utilize local knowledge and stewardship.
It’s not only the local fishing fleet, the local trustee agencies and the thousands of would-be volunteers that Unified Command chose to ignore, they refused some of the technology that has been developed by California, including the HF radar system (COCMP) that has superior forecasting capabilities, for determining the movement of the oil on the water. This technology had proven itself in the 2006 “Safe Seas” drill, but Unified Command refused to utilize it during this spill to help them understand where the oil would travel.
In the fishing fleet, no one is quite sure why there was the break down in responding to this Cosco Busan spill and its clean-up. There is the perception among our members that agencies became complacent after the last major spill with the impression that everything was in place for the next major event. Oversight became lax.
There has also been much less interaction between with the Coast Guard and the fishing fleet (e.g., vessel safety liaison) since 9/11 and the agency’s new focus on the war on terrorism.
Within the California Department of Fish & Game, there have also been a series of budget meltdowns in the last decade. Funds that were designated for oil spill prevention and clean-up had been misappropriated, positions within OSPR have gone unfilled (even though there were funds for those positions) and lately Fish & Game’s fixation with establishing Marine Protected Areas has diverted attention from the more important task of oil spill prevention. Bear in mind, MPAs are totally worthless in protecting against oil spills, or any pollution for that matter, pointing to the need to develop meaningful conservation measures that protect all bay and ocean waters.
While there were many blunders that occurred during this spill, there are some bright spots to report on. As I mentioned, the 20 fishing boats during the short time they were on the water collected a significant amount of oil (unfortunately it’s impossible to document the exact amounts because the oil they recovered was mixed with that of other responders).
The Port of San Francisco is to be commended for its efforts in this incident, stepping up and taking leadership when the responsible agencies failed – most notably with their hiring from port funds the fishermen to engage in clean-up.
The Gulf of the Farallones Marine Sanctuary and its support organization, the Farallones Marine Sanctuary Association, also should be commended for effectively deploying their Beach Watch volunteers out along the coast to monitor and document the oil and assist with the coordination of some of the volunteer clean-up efforts. They did this smoothly, effectively and with little fanfare. The Beach Watch program could serve as a model for training volunteers for monitoring, beach and wildlife clean-up so that when the next incident occurs there will be thousands of trained local personnel able to step in quickly and effectively in the response.
In their paper “Community Responses to Oil Spills” (from The Selendan Ayu Oil Spill: Lessons Learned, Alaska Sea Grant, 2006), researchers Duane Gill and Liesel Ritchie found (pp.90-91):
“The old adage that “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure” underscores its importance in emergency management. In the aftermath of the Selendang Ayu incident, several preventive measures have been suggested…. An understanding of risks provides a foundation for establishing prevention measures. Risks need to be articulated and recognized before informed and effective prevention measures can be developed and implemented…. A sociological lesson to remember is to encourage civic engagement and invest social capital in this process. Like most leaders in rural Alaska communities similar in size, Dutch Harbor/Unalaska leaders are adept at using social capital and encouraging civic engagement in community affairs. However, it is not uncommon to find disenfranchised groups in these communities. A key component in socially assessing risks is striving to include varying and sometimes competing risk perceptions throughout this process. As Waugh and Hy (1990) note for disaster planning and management, “[there is a] need for strong cooperation and coordination among public, nonprofit, and private sectors.”
The following are some recommendations we have, taken from our experience to date from the Cosco Busan spill, starting with better utilization of local knowledge as suggested by Gill and Ritchie:
Better Utilization of Local Knowledge. Our first recommendation is to look at ways to direct the Fish & Game’s OSPR to better utilize local knowledge – whether it be to more fully consult and engage with local agencies, local volunteer groups (such as those organized by marine sanctuary programs), along with fishermen, local mariners and the various non-profit river, bay and coast keeper organizations who constantly monitor many of our waterways and ocean waters. This should also include utilization of our ocean observing technologies (e.g., the HF radar) that have been developed – much of this in California through the support of the Coastal Conservancy
Included in this we believe should be opening the Unified Command to the local trustees so they can be consulted on the spot. We also question why the spiller is part of Unified Command, since decisions should be based on what’s best for the environment, not the spiller’s pocketbook. It seems to us the system is backward, when the spiller is part of the command structure and trustee agencies are on the outside. This needs changing.
Mandate Use of Fishermen/Fishing Vessels in Public and Private Oil Spill Contingency Plans. Following the failure for the past seven or eight years to train, certify and utilize the commercial fishing fleet as the single largest group of working individuals and vessels – who incidentally have the most to lose from any oil spill or other insult to the marine environment – we believe the State, and Congress as well, needs to mandate the allowance of fishermen and other local mariner participation in all future oil spill prevention, containment and clean-up incidents.
We should not overlook the valuable contribution fishing men and women can make to keeping our marine environment clean and safe, as happened with this latest spill. They should be given the opportunity to train and participate in helping protect the environment that sustains them.
Funding for Public Training in Shoreline Monitoring, Beach and Wildlife Clean-up. Part of the effort to better utilize local members of the public wanting to assist clean-up efforts is to institute regular training. We’d suggest the Gulf of the Farallones National Marine Sanctuary’s Beach Watch program as a model and agencies could perhaps tap the expertise of this program which was the first of its kind established by any of the nation’s marine sanctuaries. The Beach Watch volunteers are familiar with the local shorelines and trained in monitoring and some have experience in hazardous materials clean-up.
Funding for Long-Term Monitoring of Spill Impact. What we learned from the Exxon Valdez spill is that the impacts of such an event can last for decades. The herring fishery, for example, in Prince William Sound is still suffering 18 years after Exxon’s tanker went aground. Funds need to be available to assure that long-term monitoring can be carried out.
Improved Oversight of Private Containment and Clean-up Entities. As long as it remains policy to entrust oil spill containment and clean-up to private operators, then strong public oversight is needed to assure these operators have the capacity and ability -- including local resources -- to respond quickly and effectively when an oil or other hazardous material spill occurs.
Two issues we believe warrant discussion here: 1) should the State’s oil spill response and clean-up entity remain housed in Fish & Game or should it be moved to another agency, e.g., Cal EPA, that may be better suited for oversight than Fish & Game; and 2) should responsibility for oil and hazardous material containment and clean-up remain within the private sector or should it be a public entity funded by fees from shippers and handlers of oil and hazardous materials, e.g., when fighting fire was moved from private companies to public entities? We don’t have a recommendation, but certainly these two issues warrant discussion following the fiasco with the handling of the Cosco Busan spill.
Establish Protocols for Fishery Closures to Protect Public Health. The delay in acting to close fisheries within and adjacent to the spill area, together with the lack of any preplanning for assessing areas potentially contaminated and instituting tests of fish and shellfish, suggest to us that either statutory language is needed spelling out to the Department its responsibilities here or a least a directive is needed to the agency to have plans in place prior to any incident for dealing with fishery closures, assessments and testing.
Appointment of an Independent Commission to Investigate. Finally, following the Exxon Valdez spill, an independent commission was established – the Alaska Oil Spill Commission – to investigate what went wrong. Rather than the responsible agencies investigating themselves – investigations that are seldom extensive or critical – we believe a special commission should be established to report back to this Legislature and Governor Schwarzenegger on what went wrong, why, and what should be done to fix it.
U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Pelosi has called for an independent investigation on the federal level through the Inspector General’s office; we should have a similar independent investigation here in California to help correct the errors made at the state level.
While in the grand scheme Cosco Busan was a relatively small spill, the fact that it could not even be successfully dealt with indicates clearly that we need to fix things now, before there is a major incident.
Zeke Grader is the Executive Director for the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations (PCFFA), and can be reached at PCFFA’s Southwest Regional Office at PO Box 29370, San Francisco, CA 94129-0370, by phone to (415)561-5080 x 224, or by email to fish1ifr@aol.com. PCFFA’s web site is at: www.pcffa.org.
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