Back to PCFFA Fishermen's News Archive
“Did you ever have to make up your mind? It’s not often easy; it’s not often kind….” So goes the old 60’s tune by the Lovin’ Spoonful. Our dilemma today is not having to choose which sister, but the direction of one of our most important fisheries and the precedent that may set for the rest.
The Pacific Council is scheduled at its September Portland meeting to make a critical decision on an individual fishing quota system for the whiting fishery. Meanwhile work continues on a plan for an IFQ program for the groundfish trawlers, and a decision on limiting entry in the “open access” – a real oxymoron – portion of the groundfish fishery is expected from the PFMC at its November San Diego meeting.
What concerns us is that if the Council continues down the current road toward IFQs the ownership of the resource could end up concentrated in a few hands, basically allocating this currently diminished resource among those with the highest landings, but then casting in stone that allocation for the time when the stocks are rebuilt and more abundant. That might not be so bad, were it not for the fact that over the past score of years most of the groundfish were allocated to the trawl fleet, whose build-up the government pushed as part of the “Americanization” of the fleet following the 1976 passage of the Fishery Conservation & Management Act (“Magnuson-Stevens Act”).
Now that about half of the trawlers in the groundfish fleet have been eliminated by the buy-back, the remaining groundfish trawlers stand to do very well, profiting from the 20-year period of PFMC giving that sector an increased percentage of the total allocation and laying claim to these stocks with about 50 percent fewer boats to share it with. But fairness would seem to dictate that at least a portion of the trawl allocation for the Sebastes and blackcod be reallocated to the longline permit and open access (or whatever it will be called) fisheries, prior to establishing any system of tradable individual quotas that people will be buying and selling.
Now the remaining trawl fleet can argue that they’re paying for the buy-out of their fellow trawlers. But that doesn’t mean that the allocation formula for stocks currently being rebuilt after this fleet helped hammer those same stocks should give them the same proportion of the resource when it’s rebuilt.
I’m not saying this to be antagonistic to groundfish trawlers -- we need them. Presently, their gear is the only practical way for harvesting flatfish. But we also need to have a fair sharing of the resource with the longline permit fleet as well as those boats categorized as open access using troll and vertical gears, among other types of hook fishing.
A bigger issue, however, is that of putting the groundfish resource – or at least the trawl portion – under an IFQ system at all. Once an IFQ system is put in place its quota holders attain quasi-property right status. Despite all the government disclaimers otherwise (just look at western water law and how water contracts are treated) it’s damned hard thereafter, if not impossible, to in any way diminish or reassign that quota holder’s share absent a stock collapse or an egregious violation of fishing regulations. Not without a property right “takings” claim, anyway.
This is not to say IFQ systems are inherently bad. The North Pacific halibut/sablefish program appears to be working fairly well in spite of initial problems with allocation and some concern now that the leasing provisions may be undermining the intent of restricting quota ownership to the fishermen working onboard a vessel. The problem is that the North Pacific halibut/sablefish IFQ program is the exception among IFQ programs as far as working fishermen are concerned.
Unfortunately, instead of improving on each new IFQ program as they come along, their structures appear to be getting worse. Just consider the BSAI crab “rationalization” program that came along after the halibut/sablefish program. Crab “rationalization” has significantly reduced jobs in the fleet, reduced the number of vessels in the fleet (just as the crab quotas were being increased), reduced the payments to crew, and mandated that 90 percent of the catch be delivered to a handful of processors that were given processor quotas as part of the “ratz” plan. This plan was so bad it was opposed by the Bush Administration as a violation of basic anti-trust laws – to which it was later given a specific Congressional exemption.
When the Pacific Council takes up Pacific whiting management it will also be under enormous pressure from the largest processor on the west coast to include processor quotas. Indeed, a U.S. Senator has been enlisted by that processor to help get the whiting processors their own quotas – meaning fishermen would then have no choice but to sell their fish to those same few processors, at whatever meager price they may set.
Most newer IFQ systems, unlike the North Pacific halibut/sablefish system, allow non-fishermen to own fishing quotas. What the results have been is that a number of processors, as well as other non-fishing interests, have gained control over the quotas, leaving fishermen in the position of being forced to work for these quota holders under the quota owner’s terms, if they want to fish at all. What’s happened, in effect, is the corruption of a program that was originally touted as giving fishermen more choices and a chance to maximize the value of their catch, turning it instead into a type of economic servitude with less choice and compulsory sharing of the proceeds of their efforts with a third party – and we don’t mean Uncle Sam. Fishermen under most of these IFQ programs have become “seafaring sharecroppers.”
If its not bad enough, with these fish buyers owning harvesting quotas, now some of those who’ve handled large amounts of fish in the past are arguing they need their own processor quotas too. Their argument is that if fishermen have their own quota then they have the freedom to sell to anyone in any port. Processors with large investments in plants could then be left holding the bag – “stranded capital” they call it – if fishermen who historically delivered their catches to those plants decided to go elsewhere. This, they argue, would result in a loss of employment in those processing plants and, in turn, a downturn in economic activity in ports if catches are taken elsewhere. That was the economic argument made for BSAI processor quotas - an argument the North Pacific Council unanimously fell for. All this really is, is good old fashioned American economic competition – which of course the big boys are scared to death of.
Fear of stranded capital, loss of employment and harm to small fishing communities have been the standard scare arguments used to mask monopolistic intentions. They are nothing more than propaganda tools for a widespread effort by processors to capture a portion of a public resource – a defacto privatization – for a nominal cost (excluding campaign donations) to make enormous profits on the backs of family fishermen. In fact, there has been nothing to date in any quota program to restrict processors from simply selling their quota to a processor in another port or even outsourcing the labor to process the fish to China or another developing nation where fair labor laws don’t exist. So much for the “stranded capital, protecting local employment, and preserving fishing communities” arguments.
After getting their own quotas in the BSAI crab fishery, some of the large processors – who will lay claim to most of the fish – feel they’re on a roll. They stand to make millions either by getting the fish cheap, since they no longer have to compete for them against other processors (nor bargain with fishermen), or just by selling the quota that is given them as middle-men.
The question then is whether fishermen would be better off sticking with the status quo of trip limits, should accept IFQs with processor quotas, or should look for an alternative. One alternative that is being much talked about in different places around the country, from the Bering Sea to Maine, Port Orford to Chatham, Astoria to Morro Bay is the concept of community controlled fisheries. The concept is largely the same, but the proposals, to the extent they’ve even been fleshed out, differ greatly in detail and economic impact.
The concept of community-based fisheries quotas sounds intriguing – the idea is that a fishing port itself would be assured of a certain amount of catch each year for its own local fishermen and processors, and for maintaining its fishing infrastructure. There are many details that need to be addressed to make such a concept workable, but exploring such a concept as an alternative to either an IFQ system or the status quo for the Pacific groundfish fishery sounds intriguing. The groundfish fishery more than others (salmon or albacore, for example) lends itself to community-based management, since port fleets tend to deliver mostly back into their home ports from fishing in nearby waters. Moreover, the timing for such a change in management could not be more opportune. Many of these groundfish stocks are rebuilding, and the management schemes for at least two of the three sectors (trawl, open access) are now up in the air.
At its June 2007 meeting, the PCFFA Board of Directors voted for staff to proceed to explore and draft a “strawman” proposal or proposals for a community-based fishery for groundfish to present as an alternative to the IFQ system that the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Pacific Council were leaning toward. The trouble is, there is no “off-the shelf-model” to follow, meaning a program will pretty much have to be crafted from scratch. Exciting, in the sense tht it allows for a great deal of creativity, but daunting in the amount of detail that has to be considered to make sure a program is developed that works for fishermen, but also for processors and fishing communities too.
Below are some of the major issues we’ve identified that need to be resolved in developing a community-based fishery. We don’t have a monopoly on creative juices and would like to stimulate some of yours as we wrestle with these issues. In other words, we’d like to hear your ideas.
One of the first questions that comes to mind is whether the gear sectors should be considered as one, or remain separate. Considering them as one would, at least in theory, allow for fishermen to switch to the gear that will have the least amount of bycatch or get them the greatest value for their catch. At the same time, some changes would have to be made for those vessels currently considered open access. But would that work, and should it be included in such a proposal? Or should such decisions be left to the port communities themselves?
What exactly constitutes a “fishing community”? Is it literally everyone in a town or small defined area – the video store operator, the road worker filling in the pot holes, the undertaker, the school principal – or is it a more discrete population of those directly involved in or relying on fishing for their income, acting as a proxy for the whole community? Should it be limited to only those holding licenses to harvest fish, including commercial, or commercial and recreational, licensed fish processors? Or should it be just persons holding permits? But then what about crew or those lumped in open access? Should the fuel dock owner, the ice house manager, and the port captain be included as well, since they also feel the economic impacts of fishery management? Should a fishing community simply be a cooperative, where every fishermen and processor in the port is a member?
Our thoughts are tending toward licensed fishermen, but is that too narrow? And what about recreational fishermen? Should the two fisheries be considered part of the same community, or as separate communities?
How do we define the geographic range of a fishing community? Is it half way between the next port, or should it follow more of the natural and ocean characteristics? What about areas where vessels from two ports fish in common? Should those areas be held in common between two communities? Could a community include more than one port; for example, Bodega Bay, San Francisco and Half Moon Bay in a Gulf of the Farallones community, or Charleston and Coos Bay together in the same community?
How are decisions to be made in the fishing community? Are they based on “one man, one vote,” or on production? Is it by majority vote, some kind of super majority or by consensus? And, who should be eligible to vote? Only those enrolling in a formal community structure (a cooperative, for example), or is it open to any one qualifying as a community member, such as any licensed fisherman?
How does such a community decide who fishes and what fishing gears can be used and when? Probably the easiest and fairest way to deal with this is by maintaining much of the status quo and making changes gradually as permits are retired and revert to the community for reassignment, but there is nothing hard-and-fast about this. Are there better ideas?
While we remain skeptical about IFQ systems, any system for management must provide for the rights of an individual fisherman (or processor). So what is needed to be sure a fisherman with a long history in a fishery is not disenfranchised within either their own community or perhaps by another community with control of the fishing grounds where that individual made most of their catch?
What types of rights need to be guaranteed an individual to prevent a majority from taking away the individual’s livelihood for no just cause? Just cause may include a stock collapse or an individual who has serious fish regulation violations. But what about other instances, what protections are needed?
How is community management to be paid for? Fees are now being imposed for some of the costs associated with IFQ programs. Should communities be allowed to assess fees or royalties on the catches to their ports to offset the costs associated with their community management? What about other costs to the community?
Should such communities also be allowed to form non-profits to hold funds generated from catch royalties to pay for such items as port infrastructure held in common, or emergency relief funds (as when there has been a loss of a vessel or life, or natural damage to a port), or other needs of the community?
How should quota or a TAC be assigned to each community? Should it be based on historic landings to that port, similar to the way most IFQs are initially allocated? Or, should it be based on the amount of fish available each year for harvest within the geographic region assigned that port? In the latter case it would mean the Council and NMFS breaking the management regions into far more discreet areas.
Finally, among the list of issues considered thus far, is what role does the Pacific Council play if management authority for groundfish is delegated to fishing communities? Our thinking is that the Council still has a very important role in guiding research and stock assessments and allocating fish each year among these communities. The Council could also act as the manager in a port area where the community refuses to come together and hear appeals from decisions made by a community from aggrieved individuals. What do you think?
Over the past few years, I’ve talked to numerous fishermen unhappy with the IFQ systems, even where they personally would benefit from a large allocation of quota, who feel that there has to be a way for young people to be able to enter the fisheries without facing a huge debt load from having to buy quota, for communities to be protected, including processors and shoreside workers, and to preserve many of the intangibles related to fishing that are much more than economics.
Community-based management makes co-management of fisheries a reality. It offers a lot of promise for maintaining our small fishing ports and towns, both in the labor and the infrastructure, but it must be crafted carefully and with thought.
As has been outlined above, there are many issues that have to be addressed in developing a community-based management system. Groundfish may be the place to start, but it’s going to take some cool heads and hard work to develop the right kind of plan. But then it’s a little bit like choosing which sister to take out. The easy way is simply to go along with the direction NMFS and the Pacific Council are headed with an IFQ system. But here, what’s easy is both ugly and economically dangerous, and the processor quotas are like a miserable mother-in-law who’s decided to move in.
Developing a community-based management quota program will take longer and is harder work, but if done right will be something beautiful that we can live with. That’s the choice we currently face.
For more information about the Pacific Council’s proposed groundfish IFQ program, go to: http://www.pcouncil.org/groundfish/gfifq/Twl_Rat_Alt_070414.pdf. To comment on NMFS guidelines for Limited Access Privilege Programs (LAPPS), go to: LAP.Guidance@noaa.gov. If you’ve got ideas on community-based management of our groundfish resources, send them to Zeke Grader at: fish4ifr@aol.com.
Zeke Grader is the Executive Director of the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations (PCFFA), the west coast’s largest trade association of commercial fishing families. He can be reached at PCFFA’s Southwest Regional Office at PO Box 29370, San Francisco, CA 94129-0370, (415)561-5080, and by email to: fish4ifr@aol.com. PCFFA’s Internet Home Page is at: www.pcffa.org.